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Transitional Justice and Judicial
Activism— A Right to Accountability?
Ruti Teitel†
Victims of systemic rights abuses, their families, and non-governmental organizations are turning to international and regional human rights
tribunals to address the failure of states to investigate, prosecute, and remedy past human rights violations. In many cases this relates to acts that
occurred decades ago and for which a previous repressive regime was
responsible. In other cases there may be powerful interests within the
state, such as the police or security service, that are complicit with the
violations in question. This Article explores the historical and political
contexts in which these cases have arisen, how the courts approach the
question of state responsibility under the relevant human rights treaties
(the American Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights) and the implications for transitional justice, as they raise common
issues of what makes for accountability following state wrongs.
I argue that there is a new accountability emerging: one that is closely
associated with global and international criminal justice, which raises
issues that go to the relationship between the domestic, political, and judicial institutions engaged in transitional justice and the supranational tribunals in question. When issues in question involve violations that have
occurred in the context of previous oppressive regimes, to what extent can
supranational judicial intervention unblock or improve transitional justice
processes? What are the risks of intervening in such processes, which
often involve complex exercises in reconciliation and compromise between
antagonists in past conflicts? What remedies are appropriate and legitimate given the relative competence and legitimacy of domestic institutions
and supranational courts, understood in context? Moreover, which institution decides? At a time when such judicial intervention is gaining traction,
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this Article proposes principles that should be of relevance to transnational
courts and other actors in their consideration of such problems.
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Introduction
What might be conceived of as a “right to accountability”1 has
emerged in the rulings of the Inter-American system,2 Europe’s human
1. Compare to Robert Keohane’s pluralistic theory of accountability. See R. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force, 24 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 1121, 1123-24 (2003) (defining accountability to include two essential features: information and sanctions). See also Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE
SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 13, 23
(Andreas Schedler et al., eds. 1999).
2. For an account of some of the doctrinal developments, see Alexandra Huneeus,
International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human
Rights Courts, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2013); see also JESSICA ALMQVIST & CARLOS ESPÓ-
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rights system, and UN human rights bodies,3 as well as the International
Criminal Court (ICC).4 This right implies a set of obligations on the state,
largely read into prevailing treaty rights protections involving personal
security, such as the right to life, whether under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European or Inter-American conventions on human rights.5 Individuals, typically families of presumed
victims of human rights abuses (particularly disappearances and similar
violations of personal security, whether by state or non-state actors) are
found to be entitled to have the allegations of wrongdoing investigated and,
if substantiated, prosecuted. They may also be entitled to reparations and
other remedies regarding the acts in question or the failure to account for
them over significant periods of time. This is an important and increasingly prominent dimension of the combined internationalization and
judicialization of transitional justice.
The jurisprudence of the regional rights tribunals has its origins—
especially in the first landmark cases— in transitional justice, and is a problem arising in periods of regime change; but also, sometimes protracted
over decades and often recurring over the passage of time.6 In contexts
associated with weak and failing states, these individual rights problems
often raise complex questions of state responsibility when they are adjudicated in international fora. Historically, these situations, as difficult as
they might have been, were resolved largely in domestic fora; for example,
both South Africa and Argentina’s transitional justice arrangements were
the product of multiple stages of political bargaining and, particularly in
South Africa, processes of constitution-making, including processes of
democratic ratification, and consensus over commitments concerning

SITO,

THE ROLE OF COURTS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: VOICES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND SPAIN
(2012).
3. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights (OHCHR), Comments on the
Nepal Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconcilation Ordinance-2069 (2013); U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report on Bosn. & Herz. (2013); Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN.
1/Rev. 1 (1994); Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, Art. 7 ( 44th sess.
1992); see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26,2004); Nepal: Truth & Reconciliation Law Betrays Victims, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (2013) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Nepal], available at http://
www.hrw.org/node/114432 (discussing the inclusion of amnesty provision in the
“Truth, Reconciliation and Disappearance Ordinance,” which was passed in Nepal by
President Ram Baran Yadav on March 14, 2013).
4. See infra Part VI (proposing some of the relevant normative considerations such
as the complementarity subsidiarity principles).
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra note 13. For example, after the original transition, Argentina is at present carrying out prosecutions decades after the military-era violations occurred. See
e.g., EUROPEAN CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, On-Going Trials in Argentina: E.S.M.A., http://www.ecchr.de/argentinia_2/articles/update-trial-openings-buenos
-aires.html.
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what values should guide the transition.7
At present, however, supranational norms8 are being imposed upon
these processes (or sometimes even offered as a substitute where they have
not occurred or have broken down): regional human rights courts and the
UN Committee on Civil and Political Rights9 are requiring that states
undertake particular measures to ensure what might be denoted as a “right
to accountability” with respect to abuses that occurred during the prior
regime. This Article identifies this procedural turn and evaluates some of
the tensions and distortions resulting from conceptualizing accountability
in terms of individual human rights claims and related state
responsibilities.
This Article begins by addressing the conundrum of accountability as
it arises in the instant contexts— namely, adopting a transitional justice
perspective. Next, in Part II, it turns to issues of jurisdiction, particularly
characteristic of cases like these involving the passage of time, and the judicial innovations taken to review these cases. Part III addresses the changing law of state responsibility and what it takes to trigger this right of
accountability. Part IV explores the nature of the duty of accountability,
starting with investigations and ending with judicial interventions ordering
prosecutions. In Part V, I discuss the role of context in judicial interpretation, and the tensions between regional and international frameworks.
Lastly, in Part VI, I propose a series of normative principles, which bear on
how to think about this line of adjudication and should offer direction
towards resolving the dilemma of the judicial confrontation with past political wrongdoing.
The emergence of a “rights” approach at the supranational level has a
number of important implications: it means a shift in the relevant decisionmakers, institutions, and processes, as well as a restructuring and narrowing of the relevant questions. Further, the emphasis shifts from political
and social goals of transition, to other more limited aims such as procedural justice for victims and their families as a separate and more concrete
objective, one ostensibly required under international and regional human
rights instruments.
The normative question of what the relationship of the judiciary to
political branches should be is a perennial one for constitutional democracies, and in the human rights area the problem tends to be conceptualized
through an analogy to the problem of constitutional review in a domestic
7. For an illustration on the case law, see Azanian Peoples Org. and Others v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC). See also Azanian Peoples Org.
and Others v. Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1996 (4) SA 562 (CC) (upholding
amnesty agreement against victim’s challenge). One might interpret the later change in
Argentine policy to be reinforced by constitutional change in the country and related
case law, where the constitution was amended to specify the relevance of international
sources. See CONST. NAC. (Arg.). See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
(2000) [hereinafter TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL].
8. See Ruti G. Teitel, Editorial Note— Transitional Justice Globalized, 2 INT’L J. OF
TRANSITIONAL JUST.1, 1 (2008).
9. See OHCHR, supra note 3.

R
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system. But is this frame of analysis applicable here without modification
or adjustment? The domestic judiciary is, after all, embedded within a particular political and constitutional system, often with checks and balances,
and a structured ongoing dialogue with the political branches. The supranational rights institutions stand, by contrast, aloof from the domestic
politics of transitional justice and indeed from what might be called the
politics of transitional constitutionalism generally. How then to understand their contribution, and their legitimacy relative to that of domestic
institutions?
The prevailing commentary on these judicial developments tends to
evaluate these emerging trends from a human rights perspective where
individual injury and repair is key. When it comes to human rights, where
universal elements to the underlying norm— or at least moral foundations
to those norms— is a basic intuition, we should not be entirely surprised to
see that tribunals in different regions tend to cite and even to follow one
another’s decisions.10 The demonstrable concern for persons and peoples
in international law cuts across multiple legal orders, including the
regional and international discussed here.11
I. The Core Problem of Accountability: Disappearances as
Emblematic
The “right to accountability” jurisprudence derives from a puzzle of
repression that was associated with the repressive policy of disappearances. In the last decades of the twentieth century and in the beginning of
the twenty-first century, there was an emerging phenomenon of “disappearances,” particularly in Latin America. These refer to abductions, torture,
government condonation, denials, and often executions. The disappearances adopted as a matter of state policy to terrorize political opposition
that characterized military rule throughout Latin America have come to be
recognized as egregious crimes against humanity, and this recognition is
set out in recent treaties such as the Rome Statute establishing the ICC;12 it
has also appeared in case law, like Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, and
has also been documented by truth commissions in the region, such as the
landmark Argentine commission, known as Nunca Mas.13
These situations pose a conundrum of rule of law. Typically the state
denies any involvement with the disappearance, and the victims’ families
and others who seek accountability have at best circumstantial evidence of
the culpability or complicity of the state. Therefore, unless there is some
form of accountability (at least an investigation), state responsibility cannot be established; but if state responsibility can only be established
10. See discussion of Varnava infra Part II.
11. See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW (2011) [hereinafter TEITEL,
HUMANITY’S].
12. Id. at 5– 7.
13. See Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 153
(July 29, 1988). See also Commission Nacional Sobre La Desaparicion De Personas, Nunca
Mas (1986).
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through accountability, how is it possible to impose in the first place, on
principles of international law, or a duty upon the state to launch that
process of accountability?
While the Latin American cases are connected to a historical pattern
of oppressive military rule, the context of the European jurisprudence is
rather different: the context is counter-terror responses to insurgent or separatist movements, and the increase in weak and fragile states in areas in
flux have led to increased recourse to courts for judicial protection under
the European Convention.14 For example, an increasing number of cases
involving disappearances are now arising out of the so-called war on terror
in Turkey,15 as well as the former Soviet Union’s Islamic periphery.16 Similarly, in a number of cases coming out of the Chechnya conflict, there have
been repeated instances of forced disappearances during Russian operations in 2001, for example, Isayeva v. Russia and Barzorkina v. Russia.17
Disappearances present a problem for assessing responsibility for
many reasons: most obviously, because of the absence of critical evidence,
such as the body of the disappeared, and due to government denials of
responsibility, the usual order of remedies (habeas, exhaustion of government remedies, finding of government responsibility, and reparations) is
frustrated. A typical and central feature of disappearances is that they are
usually accompanied by recurring government denials of wrongdoing;
therefore, the absence of immediately or initially available evidence along
with the denials that appear to close the door to the gathering or disclosure
of such evidence results in a lack of opportunity for domestic accountability.18 Perhaps most obvious, yet at the same time most troubling, is that
the disappeared cannot represent themselves. As reflected in the case law,
they find a voice when represented by NGOs, as well as by next of kin. By
now, these are added voices, which in turn are generating new demands for
accountability, and arguably new rights for next of kin and others— informing a distinctive conception of justice.19
II. Jurisdiction, the Passage of Time and the Quandary of the
Wrongful Act
In this Part, I take up the problem these cases present for obtaining
jurisdiction over wrongdoing after an extended passage of time.20 An
important dimension to the relevance of context in the emergence of the
14. See, e.g., El-Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No.
39630/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. 80 (2012). See also Anguelova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 38361/97
Eur. Ct. H.R. 311 (2002).
15. El-Masri, App. No. 39630/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 192.
16. See, e.g., Turkmenistan: End Enforced Disappearances, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/turkmenistan-end-enforceddisappearances.
17. Bazorkina v. Russia, App. No. 69481/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. 9 (2006); Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
18. Id.
19. See discussion infra Part VI(d).
20. See Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 4– 28 (1992).
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new duties of accountability has been elaborated in accountability over
time. A crucial contextual dimension of the Latin American disappearances cases is that they are often brought to the courts by NGOs as petitioners, or lawyers for victims’ families, after a protracted period of delay
during which successive administrations have failed to respond to wrongdoing.21 It is this impunity through protracted inaction that has become
the core problem the regional rights systems have had to confront— how to
wrestle with this kind of domestic political failure or failure of the rule of
law.
There is an evolving conceptualization of the nature of wrongful action
at stake in these cases that seems to cut across the judicial systems. In
both the Inter-American and European rights systems, the judiciary refers
to the complex nature of disappearances and have observed approvingly
that there is agreement on the complex, multiple, and continuous character
of the breach, one which seems to incorporate understandings of the violation in terms of rights to accountability;22 that is, they appear to have come
up with a consolidated doctrine.
Starting with the landmark case of Velasquez-Rodriguez, wherever the
issue has arisen, the rights courts rely on both a number of international
conventions and comparative law across judicial systems.23 The judicial
conclusion that the disappearance is a “complex” offense and involves multiple ongoing breaches referring to systemic denials and failure to prevent,
investigate, and punish has a number of important effects for the establishment of the evolving duty of accountability— laying the bases for jurisdiction and reparation over time.24
The conceptualization of the offense has implications for the characterization of the political and legal context of the case law, as well as for the
requirement of exhaustion, ordinarily a predicate to access the regional
rights systems. Thus, in Velasquez-Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACHR) emphasized the relevance of the political context.
In the court’s words, “the investigation committees created by the government and armed forces did not produce any results. The judicial processes
have proceeded slowly . . . with a clear lack of interest.”25
In a similar way, in Baysayeva v. Russia, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR), in evaluating the rule of exhaustion as to domestic remedies, asserted that according to the European Convention Article 35(1):
There is no requirement that recourse should be had to remedies which are
inadequate or ineffective26 . . . the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies
21. For a comprehensive discussion of these petitions, see Patricia P. Zuloaga, Dissertation Presentation at NYU JSD Forum (2012).
22. See Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary objectives, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186, ¶ 111, n. 70 (Aug. 12, 2008) (citing Kurt
v. Turkey and other ECHR cases).
23. See id. at paras. 34, 111.
24. See Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 147
(July 29, 1988)
25. Id.
26. See Baysayeva v. Russia, App. No. 74237/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 104 (2007).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-2\CIN204.txt

392

unknown

Seq: 8

23-SEP-15

Cornell International Law Journal

8:43

Vol. 48

must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism, the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being
applied automatically . . . it is essential to have regard to the circumstances
of the individual case. This means, in particular, that the Court must take
realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal
system of the Contracting State concerned but also of the general context in
which they operate.27

In so holding, the regional rights court relied on prior cases coming out of
southeastern Turkey, such as Aksoy v. Turkey, involving detention without
judicial access, and allegations of torture in the context of Kurdish separatist terrorism.28
As to the question of the relevance of the passage of time for accountability, remarkably in Heliodoro Portugal, the IACHR adjudicated the dispute
even though the original disappearance and extrajudicial execution
occurred prior to the state party, Panama, agreeing to be subject to the
court’s jurisdiction. Grounding jurisdiction on the theory that the disappearance itself was a continuing wrongful act, the court drew on the principle of the continuing breach of state responsibility rather than fully
conceiving the failure to provide accountability as an autonomous internationally wrongful act— which, of course, obviously continued up to the time
the petition was brought, and persisted until and unless there was state
explanation.29
By way of comparison, the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, as well as Article 7 of the
Statute of the ICC, provide that one of the elements of the wrongful act of
the “forced disappearance of persons” is “refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person which place such a person outside the protection of the
law.”30 Here, one can see that there is a basis in treaty law for finding that
the right to accountability is a primary obligation. This, however, would
seem to apply only under these instruments where attribution of the original abduction, arrest, or detention to the state is possible— in other words,
where these occur. As to disappearance itself, at least two dimensions or
stages are distinguished: “forced disappearances of persons” means “the
arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons, acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State.” Importantly, the judicially-crafted right to
accountability as a primary obligation extends further to situations where
attribution to the state ordinarily cannot necessarily be established (and
may even be intended to overcome the evidentiary difficulties of the attri27. Id. at para. 105.
28. Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 53 (1996).
29. See Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186, ¶¶ 34,
111 (Aug. 12, 2008). See also Goiburú v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (2006) (noting that these are long postponed claims).
30. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. UN Doc A/61/488 (Dec. 23, 2010).
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bution exercise, given the context).31
The American Convention itself contemplates attribution in order to
establish the wrongfulness of the original act of forced disappearances: the
“deprivation of liberty through the direct intervention of State agents or
their acquiescence,” that the IACHR refers to as “the refusal to acknowledge the detention and to reveal the situation or the whereabouts of the
interested person.”32 Hence, in Gomes Lund, the court held that it was
independently wrongful for the state to refuse “to acknowledge the detention and to reveal the situation or the whereabouts of the interested person”
by implication, whether or not the original act can be attributed to it.33
The court in La Cantuta v. Peru, however, relied on a very broad view of
attribution under the American Convention, distinguishing sharply from
what would ordinarily be required to establish responsibility under international criminal law. In that case, the IACHR declared:
International liability of the States arises automatically with an international
wrong attributable to the State and, unlike under domestic criminal law, in
order to establish that there has been a violation of the rights enshrined in
the American Convention, it is not necessary to determine the responsibility
of its author or their intention, nor is it necessary to identify individually the
agents who are attributed with the violations. In this context, the Court ascertains the international liability of the State in this case, which may not be
made modeled after structures that belong exclusively to domestic or international criminal law, which in turn defines responsibility or individual
criminal liability; nor is it necessary to define the scope of action and rank
of each state officer involved in the events.34

In Goiburú, the IACHR indicated the importance of considering the
“context” of the disappearance case brought before them and referred to
the increase in “[t]he State’s international responsibility,”35 “because the
facts occurred within the framework of Operation Condor” and “due to the
failure to comply with the obligation to investigate them effectively.”36 The
definition or characterization of the wrongful act is what gives rise to the
particular obligations identified in these cases— in other words, the “recognition of the continuing or permanent nature of the forced disappearance
of persons.”37 Indeed, as the Goiburú court established, during the 1970s,
“the intelligence services of several countries of the Southern cone, established a criminal inter-state organization with a complex assemblage, the
scope of which is still being revealed today; in other words there was a
systematic practice of ‘state terrorism at an inter-State level.’ ”38 This trans31. See Heliodoro Portugal, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 186. See also Goiburú, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. No. 153.
32. See Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶¶ 103– 104 (2010).
33. See id. at para. 104.
34. La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
(ser. C), No. 162, ¶ 156 (2006) (emphasis added).
35. See Goiburú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 153 at paras. 86– 94.
36. See id.
37. See id. at para. 80.
38. Id. at para. 72.
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national policy of repression is conceived by the court as in “absolute contradiction to the principal objects and purposes of the organization of the
international community” whether in the various international bodies and
the American Convention itself.
The Goiburú court’s observation engages the particular telos of the
regional human rights court when violations are perpetrated in a transnational, regional way: “the ‘situation of general impunity’ conditions the protection of the rights in question,”39 “[f]orced disappearance . . . reproduces
the conditions of impunity.”40 Hence, one can see that the relevant context
for the court includes the transnational dimensions of these crimes, which
are conceived of as violations erga omnes, and triggers the responsibility of
other states and the international community as a whole.41
In another more recent case, Gomes Lund, involving claims with
respect to disappearances in Brazil,42 the IACHR observed that the operative definition of the phenomenon included “the unlawful detention by
agents or governmental agencies or organized groups of private individuals
acting in the name of the state or counting on its support, authorization or
consent.”43 The court observed that the act of disappearance commences
with the “deprivation of liberty,” is “followed by the lack of information
regarding the whereabouts, and continues until the whereabouts of the disappeared persons are found and the true identity is revealed with certainty.” Hence, one can see the ways that state responsibility plays a role in
the definition of the wrongful act; accordingly, the wrongful act is being redefined in terms of the refusal of the state to acknowledge its responsibility
under the primary obligation. Moreover, the failure to provide acknowledgment or information, often in an ongoing way, can be seen as the continuation of the wrongful act.44
The newfound characterization of international wrongfulness in terms
of accountability has been pivotal to recent cases involving disappearances,
even where they may have occurred decades ago. Throughout Latin
America, the IACHR has been ruling on responsibility, even for kidnappings that occurred close to half a century prior to the human rights litigation.45 Thus, in the landmark case of Heliodoro Portugal, the IACHR
evaluated whether it had jurisdiction to hear a case involving an abduction
39. Id. at para. 88.
40. Id. at para. 89.
41. Id. at para. 93.
42. On Brazil’s disappearance policy, see Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 219, ¶ 30, n.32 (2010); The International Center for Transitional Justice,
ICTJ Welcomes the Historic Final Report from Brazil’s National Truth Commission (Dec. 10,
2014), available at https://www.ictj.org/news/ictj-welcomes-historic-final-report-brazil%E2%80%99s-national-truth-commission (regarding the most recent “release of the
final report of Brazil’s National Truth Commission after two and a half years of work to
unveil the truth about serious human rights violations that took place in the country
between 1946 and 1988, especially during the military dictatorship of 1964 to 1985”).
43. See Nitay Nech v. Guatemala, Preliminary objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212, ¶ 102 (May 25, 2010).
44. Id. at paras. 103– 104.
45. Id.
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that occurred at the hands of state officials in 1970, decades before Panama had accepted the jurisdiction of the court.46 Despite the extended
passage of time, the court concluded that the breach could not be considered as merely involving a detention or loss of life; rather, “the deprivation
of liberty of the individual must be understood merely as the beginning of
the constitution of a complex violation that is prolonged over time until the
fate and whereabouts of the alleged victim are established.”47 In Heliodoro
Portugal, the IACHR held that the deprivation of liberty by state agents,
without information being provided on an individual’s whereabouts, initiated the individual’s forced disappearance; this violation continued over
time after 1990— until his remains were identified in 2000, three decades
after the abduction.48 Relying on a combination of concepts, including
composite and continuing breach, it regarded the failure to acknowledge or
explain as an element of an ongoing internationally wrongful act, referring
to forced disappearance as an “autonomous offense of a continuing or permanent nature with its multiple elements.”49 It also observed that “the
general obligation to ensure the human rights embodied in the Convention, contained in Article 1(1), gives rise to the obligation to investigate
violations of the substantive rights that should be protected, ensured or
guaranteed . . . .”50 While in some regard, the passage of time might make
imposing accountability more difficult, raising issues about the credibility
of evidence has, conversely, opposite consequences for assessing the duty
of accountability. Indeed, a very long period of non-accountability points
to the kind of political failure or deeply rooted pathology of impunity that
makes supranational judicial intervention more plausible and legitimate.51
One can see this dimension of the passage of time in the case law of
the ECHR as well.52 Consider the protracted delay between the original
detention and the state inquiry: this gap in accountability played an important role for the ECHR in Timurtas v. Turkey, where it held that the investigation into the disappearance was considered “inadequate and therefore in
breach of the State’s procedural obligations to protect the right to life.”53
Moreover, such delay was considered to justify judicial intervention: “[T]he
lethargy displayed by the investigating authorities poignantly bears out the
importance of the prompt judicial intervention required by Article 5, 3 and
4 of the Convention which, may lead to the detection and prevention of lifethreatening measures in violation of the fundamental guarantees contained
in Article 2 . . . .”54
46. Heliodoro Portugal v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186, ¶ 111, n. 70
(Aug. 12. 2008).
47. Id. at para. 112.
48. Id. at para. 113 (referring to the violation of Article 7 of the Convention).
49. Id. at para. 112.
50. Id.
51. See Laurel Fletcher et al., Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice:
A Historical Perspective, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 163 (2009).
52. Id.
53. Timurtas v. Turkey, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 221 at paras. 88– 90 (2000).
54. Id. at para. 89.
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In Varnava and Others v. Turkey, the ECHR followed the logic regarding the passage of time taken by the IACHR in Heliodoro Portugal. In a
dispute involving a disappearance that occurred in 1974, the ECHR
invoked the IACHR and the UN Human Rights Committee, noting that they
“apply the same approach” to the “procedural aspect of disappearances”
examining allegations of denial of justice or judicial protection, “even
where the disappearance occurred before recognition of its jurisdiction.”55
Ultimately, such cases point us in the direction of recognizing an independent feature of the right of accountability.
III. Supranational Judicial Interpretation: Generating New Duties to
Accountability
In all of the cases discussed, there is some alleged human rights abuse
in the past that triggers state responsibility to investigate, prosecute, and
remediate. Ensuing changes in the conceptualization of state responsibility, particularly those that go beyond stated requirements regarding state
action in the law of attribution,56 are emblematic of these complex cases of
disappearances where attribution questions are very difficult, though also
arising in the “war on terror.”57 Indeed, there are clear similarities between
the practices of disappearances and those of rendition in the issues of
ongoing government cover-up, the attempt to evade public scrutiny, and
the hiding of identities of perpetrators and victims.58 In these circumstances— notwithstanding the challenge of attribution— the case law
appears to point to the elaboration of new duties, informing rights of prevention and accountability, investigation, repair, and even particular punishment or other remedies, such as the erection of monuments and
museums.59
Indeed, in order to craft a “right” of accountability, the courts have
had to overcome a variety of doctrinal obstacles, and have been innovative
with respect to issues such as standing, attribution to the state, and evidentiary burdens, as well as the requirement to exhaust local remedies.60 The
result has been a continuous expansion of state responsibilities ostensibly
derived from the protection of the core human right to life. This is a development that is occurring not only in regional human rights litigation but
in other fora as well, such as the UN Human Rights Committee, and is
55. Varnava and Others v. Turkey, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 at para. 147 (2009).
There was also a dissent against finding jurisdiction. Id.
56. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (James Crawford et al. eds. 2010).
57. See El-Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09
Eur. Ct. H.R. 80 (2012).
58. On some of the similarities between “renditions” and “disappearances,” see
Amnesty Int’l, USA: Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and “Disappearance, AMR
51/051/2006 (April 4, 2006).
59. See Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (2006); La Cantuta
v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Series C, No. 202, ¶ 254 (2006) (order to erect the memorial
“The Crying Eye”).
60. See discussion infra Part VI(d).
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reinforced by the growing consensus on state responsibility to prosecute in
international criminal law.61
A. The Changing Law of State Responsibility and the Role of Context
In this subpart, I explore the jurisprudence on the “right to accountability” from the perspective of state responsibility in international law. The
basic premise of state responsibility in general in international law is that a
state is responsible for remedying every internationally wrongful act that is
attributable to it.62 The ILC Articles on State Responsibility codify general
international law with respect to so-called secondary obligations— the
remedial consequences that flow from the violation of a primary norm—
while also providing rules on attribution to the state of acts and omissions
that may be internationally wrongful. The distinctiveness of the right to
accountability that is evolving in recent jurisprudence can be appreciated
when we examine the challenges of state responsibility in the contexts in
question, especially disappearances.
One way of conceptualizing the obligation of the state to investigate,
prosecute, and remediate is as a secondary obligation that flows from a
past violation of international human rights law (for example, the alleged
original act of disappearance and torture). This approach of course
depends on a finding that the original act was internationally wrongful.
But, in the contexts in question, often the evidence is inadequate to make
such a finding with the required certainty. If someone disappears, there
may only be circumstantial evidence at best that the disappearance is
attributable to an act or omission of the state. Proving direction, control,63
or endorsement is very difficult, especially given the way in which collusion between dictatorships and various non-state groups worked in Latin
America to produce the oppression in question.
Generally speaking (though not always), the judicial bodies in question have sought to bypass these or the complexities of state responsibility
by conceiving the obligation to investigate, prosecute, and remediate as an
autonomous primary obligation rather than as a secondary obligation that
flows from a previous internationally wrongful human rights violation. In
this way, it is possible to find that there is “a right to accountability”
regardless of whether it can be established that the original human rights
abuses were themselves internationally wrongful acts engaging state
responsibility. And, it is this conceptualization— again, driven in signifi61. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report on Bosn. & Herz., (106th sess. 15 October– 2 November 2012), CCPR/C/
HIB/CO/2 (Nov. 13, 2013); Pablo de Grieff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, UN Doc. A/HRC/
21/46 (Aug. 9, 2012); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Nepal, supra note 3.
62. Judge Trindade’s separate opinion calls for greater convergence regarding trends
of international responsibility for state crime and individual criminal responsibility for
grave human rights, and Judge Trindade notes that the trend has been to individuate
responsibility for state crimes with loss of public dimension, for example in the form of
public hearings. See Goiburú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 153.
63. See International Law Commission arts. 5, 8, 11.
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cant measure by the complexities of state responsibility in this context—
that plunges judicial bodies into the oversight of transitional justice
broadly understood, moving well beyond simply remedying past internationally wrongful acts. At the same time, in some of the cases, one sees
alternative, more cautious, fact-specific theories of continuing or composite
breach, or context-based evidentiary presumptions of state involvement or
complicity, which suggest that some judges may not be entirely comfortable with the very broad implications of crafting an autonomous primary
obligation of accountability.
The logic of a separate primary obligation of accountability is already
present in the landmark case Velasquez-Rodriguez, the first contentious case
involving disappearances in the IACHR,64 and can be seen in subsequent
cases in that system.65 With these preliminary observations about context
and state responsibility in mind, we can now examine from a comparative
perspective the manner in which “the right to accountability” has been
articulated in the jurisprudence.
Let us begin with two cases (one European, one Latin American)
where the judiciary grapples with the problem of international responsibility in context. Under the “right to life” in the European Convention, the
ECHR recognized affirmative accountability-related obligations that clearly
go beyond the admittedly general language of the Convention. This is true
as well of the “right against torture and inhumane treatment,” which is an
even more general provision of the Convention: Article 3. Thus, in Finogenov and Others v. Russia, a case involving Chechen separatists and hostagetaking, the ECHR held that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the
European Convention, and found, among other violations, a lack of “effective investigation.” In such circumstances, the court asserted that the
“authorities were under an obligation to carry out an effective official
investigation in order to provide a ‘satisfactory and convincing’ explanation
of the victims’ deaths and the degree of the authorities’ responsibility for
it.”66 The court went on to refer to the investigators’ failure “to establish
certain facts which in the court’s opinion were relevant and even crucial for
addressing the question of the authorities alleged negligence.”67 Indeed,
one can see that the internationally wrongful act the court identified here
as giving rise to state responsibility is the flawed investigation of the
disappearance.
64. Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 126 (July
29, 1988) (discussing the standard of proof for cases involving the “official practice of
disappearances”); id. at para. 155 (“forced disappearance of human beings is a multiple
and continuous violation of many rights under the Convention”).
65. See id. at para. 153; Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
186, ¶ 111, n. 70 (Aug. 12, 2008). See also Timurtas v. Turkey, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 221 at
paras. 88– 90 (2000); Varnava and Others v. Turkey, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 at para.
147 (2009).
66. See Finogenov and Others v. Russia, App Nos. 18299/03, 27311/03 Eur. Ct. H.R.
at para. 273 (2011). See also El-Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
App. No. 39630/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 104 (2012); Anguelova v. Bulgaria, App. No.
38361/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. 311 (2002).
67. Finogenov, Nos. 18299/03, 27311/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 280.
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One should consider Goiburú, where the IACHR justified its intervention in Paraguay’s decades-long, systemic “culture of impunity” which gave
rise to “heightened state responsibility.”68 The regional rights court characterized the facts of the case as having occurred within the context of a
systematic pattern or practice that had been applied or tolerated by the
state— thus setting up the applicability of a heightened responsibility standard. According to the IACHR:
This case has unique historic importance: the facts occurred in the context
of the systematic practice of arbitrary detention, torture, execution and disappearance perpetrated by the intelligence and security forces of the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, under “Operation Condor,” whose
characteristics and dynamics have been described in the proven facts . . . .69
In other words, the grave acts took place in the context of the flagrant, massive and systematic repression to which the population was subjected on an
inter-State scale, because State security agencies were let loose against the
people at a transborder level in a coordinated manner by the dictatorial Governments concerned . . . the context in which the facts took place permeates
and conditions the State’s international responsibility in relation to its obligation to respect and safeguard the rights embodied in Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and
25 of the Convention, with regard to both the aspects acknowledged by the
State and those that will be determined in the following chapters on merits
and reparations.70

Here, the court effectively seems to be taking judicial notice of pervasive state involvement in the initial pattern of wrongful acts, pointing to a
heightened state responsibility that is not necessarily predicated upon individual inquiry into attribution. In Gomes Lund, the IACHR, in evaluating
Brazil’s disappearance policy including the extermination of guerillas and
military denial, recognized the systematic pattern or practice tolerated by
the state and embedded the relevant state obligation in its interpretation of
the wrongful act. As the Gomes Lund court asserted, “the enforced disappearance constitutes a multi-offensive violation of various rights protected
by the American Convention including the ‘refusal to acknowledge the
detention and to reveal the situation or the whereabouts of the interested
person.’”71 While these rights may not be stated as such in the Convention, they emerge through judicial interpretation of the implicated rights
and obligations.
In the next subpart, I turn to the evidentiary challenges these cases
present and how the courts have responded to them by making findings
about the general political or historical context, or political culture, thereby
reflecting another form of contextualization.

68. See id.
69. See, e.g., Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, ¶¶ 62– 63
(2006).
70. See id.
71. See Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 219, ¶ 103 (2010).
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B. Triggering State Responsibility and Shifting the Evidentiary Burden
One of the consequences of the adoption of a right to accountability is
the shift in the understanding of proof and evidence. The phenomenon of
disappearance in full daylight crystallizes this dimension of the problem of
accountability. In Velasquez-Rodriguez, the IACHR characterized the
kidnappings as occurring in “broad daylight”; that is, in full view, and then
followed by disappearance and denial. The recognition of systematic practices— along with the apparent impossibility of accountability— have rendered these human rights abuses not just violations of physical integrity,
but also problems of the defiant absence of state acknowledgment and
other follow-on practices. Yet, the conundrum these cases raise is how to
advance accountability where the state denies any responsibility, or where
the facts could lead to a finding of an internationally wrongful act.
Here, again, we see the power of the technique of characterizing the
continuing failure of accountability as an autonomous internationally
wrongful act. In Velasquez-Rodriguez, the IACHR combined the notion of
the failure of accountability being an independently wrongful act under the
Convention with theories of continuing and composite breach.72 While it
characterized “the forced disappearance of human beings as a multiple and
continuous violation of many rights under the Convention,” it went on to
declare that the rights at stake relate to personal liberty but also to “access
to a competent court.”73
Along these lines, consider Brazilian disappearance policy in Gomes
Lund involving extermination of guerillas in the region, where the military
engaged in blanket denial of involvement.74 Here, the IACHR noted that a
“systematic pattern or practice . . . tolerated by the state” was a characteristic of enforced disappearances. In Goiburú, the IACHR emphasized that
the “grave acts” took place in the context of flagrant, massive, and systematic repression. Furthermore, “this operation also benefited from the general situation of impunity of the grave human rights violations that existed
at the time.”75 State involvement and complicity was a fundamental feature of this context: “The context in which the facts took place permeates
and conditions the State’s international responsibility in relation to its obligation to respect and safeguards the rights embodied in Articles 4, 5, 7, 8
and 25 of the Convention.”76
In Isayeva, a leading case of forced disappearance arising in the context of the Chechnya conflict, the ECHR took a different route to the evidentiary challenge of attribution by reversing the burden of proof on
attribution. Attribution is distinct in Latin America: where disappearances
occur in “broad daylight,” kidnappers will be presumed to be agents of the
state. The theory in the Latin American context is that, but for the partici72. See Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C). No. 4, ¶¶ 149,
153 (July 29, 1988).
73. Id. at para. 155.
74. Gomes Lund, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 219 at para. 90.
75. See Goiburú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 153 at para. 73.
76. Id. at para. 62.
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pation or at least acquiescence of the state, no one would risk such an
operation given the high chance of detection by the authorities.77 In
Timurtas, a case arising out of a disappearance in Turkey, the ECHR linked
international responsibility to Article I of the Convention, a general provision requiring state parties to give full effect to the treaty. The ECHR said
that where someone taken into custody in good health is then found to be
injured, it is incumbent upon the state to provide a plausible explanation,
failing which an issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention.78
One could read this jurisprudential move in either of two ways. First,
the court could be establishing an evidentiary presumption that if someone is injured on the state’s watch, the injury is attributable to the state, to
which the burden shifts to provide a plausible explanation. Alternatively,
one could see the court as reaching for an autonomous obligation of
accountability for harm to detainees regardless of whether the acts themselves that directly cause the harm are attributable to the state. The ECHR,
here, refers to the landmark IACHR decision in Velasquez-Rodriguez and the
way the violation of the right to life can be shown as a consequence of a
forced disappearance.79
Consider Kilic v. Turkey, a case involving complaints against Turkey’s
state security forces, including a failure to investigate. In this case, the
ECHR observed that there were common features of a number of situations
where public prosecutors had failed to investigate cases allegedly involving
members of the security forces, giving rise to the strong implication that
there was a pattern of intentionally covering up actions of state security.80
In this regard, there are relevant precedents arising out of cases involving
the war on terror, requiring a right to an effective investigation and reading
“anti-impunity” into general provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights. In El-Masri, the ECHR concluded “that the summary investigation that has been carried out in this case cannot be regarded as an
effective one capable of leading to the identification and punishment of
those responsible for the alleged events and of establishing the truth.”81
C. In Whose Name: A Right to Accountability Beyond the Disappeared?
Yet another dimension of the right to accountability goes to the parameters of enforcement, and the question of who can exercise or enforce such
rights. While, as discussed above, the foundation of the right doctrinally
rests to a significant extent on an expansive view of the responsibilities of
77. Id. at para. 117.
78. See supra discussion accompanying Timurtas, note 53.
79. See Timurtas v. Turkey, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 221 at para. 80 (citing Velazquez-Rodriguez, inter alia).
80. Kilic v. Turkey, App. No. 22492/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 73 (2000).
81. See El-Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09
Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 193 (2012); Anguelova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 38361/97 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 311 at para. 140 (2002).
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the state to protect the “right to life,”82 the suggestion is that it is the victim
whose right to accountability is violated in these cases. There is also a
tendency to allow not only next of kin to have standing to enforce the right
on behalf of the victim, but also to see the right to accountability as a right
that next of kin also possess themselves.83
One issue is the risk in simply equating the conception of transitional
justice with the currently recognized rights of victims and their families,
which seems to be part of a broader phenomenon of the trend towards
judicialization. The focus on victims is almost an essential byproduct of
these petitions because accountability is being demanded and argued in
terms of the rights belonging to the victims and their families. There is, of
course, also the question of how close the connection between the petitioner and the victim has to be in order for petitioners to have standing to
make claims on the victims’ behalf.
The victim’s focus often lends a partial and particular perspective on
what normatively is at stake in these cases.84 Given the broader social
harm that characterizes systemic wrongdoing, to what extent is the human
rights paradigm apt to deal with this phenomenon? Victims and their survivors raise questions regarding the scope of the implicated right; in other
words, in litigation where rights to accountability to “next of kin” are often
extended.85 In this formulation, we can see the influence of human rights
litigation as well as the centrality of the victim and her justice. The courts
are again interpreting the general rights provisions of the treaty schemes,
such as regarding the denial of humane treatment to apply to next of kin
because of their assessment of the effects of state inaction upon investigations and access to justice.86
Beginning with the fundamental “right to life” for “next of kin,” the
courts have ultimately read other duties for actors into broader principles
and rights, such as the right to an investigation. For example, in Kilic, the
ECHR interpreted the obligation to protect life under Article 2, read
together with the state’s general duty under Article 1 “to secure to everyone
within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention,” as requiring by implication that there should be some form of “effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of
the use of force.”87 As to the rights of victims’ families, the ECHR read the
Convention’s remedial Article 13 to require a thorough and effective inves82. See Finogenov and Others v. Russia, App. Nos. 18299/03, 27311/03 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at para. 273 (2011). See also Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No.
153, ¶¶ 62– 63 (2006).
83. See Anguelova, App. No. 38361/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 140 (“In all cases, however, the next of kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.”).
84. See La Cantuta v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182, ¶ 254(12) (2006)
(ordering remedy of memorial).
85. See Goiburú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 153; Baysayeva v. Russia, App. No. 74237/01
Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 139– 43 (2007) (finding violation of applicant’s husband right to
be protected from inhuman treatment).
86. See Baysayeva, App. No. 74237/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 104.
87. Kilic v. Turkey, App. No. 22492/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 78 (2000).
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tigation for the victim’s brother: “[E]veryone whose rights and freedoms
. . . are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting
in an official capacity.” The court recognized that “Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to
enforce the substance of the Convention’s rights and freedoms in whatever
form they might happened to be secured in the domestic legal order . . . .”88
While Contracting States have “some discretion as the manner in which
they conform to their Convention obligations under this provision . . . its
exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the
authorities of the respondent State . . . .”89
Drawing on structural arguments, where the importance of the right at
stake matters, the ECHR interpreted the parameters of the Convention’s
remedy: “Given the fundamental importance of the right to protection of
life, Article 13 requires in addition to the payment of compensation where
appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those responsible for the deprivation of
life and including effective access for the complainant to the investigation
procedure . . . .”90 Thus, Kilic shows how the court moves from the “right
to life” to imply a right to investigation that is linked to the other rights
provisions in the convention. The court appears to be giving a teleological
reading to these other rights provisions.
IV. The Obligation to Accountability in Context
In this Part, I move from issues of jurisdiction and attribution in these
complex disappearance cases to the question of the relevant obligation of
accountability once a question is before the courts. What standard of conduct does the recognition of the right to accountability imply? While the
enforcement of protection of a right to life would imply the existence of
some justice system, under the Conventions this would seem to be a fairly
general duty. In what sense are these universals91 and, if related to context, then the question becomes, “what counts?” Is state inaction the relevant factor? The courts could assess or view political failure in a number of
different ways, for example, in terms of unwillingness or incapacity.92 Just
how does context get brought in? Is its use in defining how much the state
is required to do, or which failures engage its responsibility under the relevant norms? Or is it used in deciding what remedies are now required to
repair the failures? This is relevant to the extent to which the right to
accountability can legitimately constrain political and judicial decisionmaking at the local level. It may be relatively easy to say that the right to
accountability has been violated when there is a complete unwillingness to
88. Id. at para. 91.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See TEITEL, HUMANITY’S, supra note 11.
92. See Kevin Davis and Benedict Kingsbury, Obligation Overload: Adjusting the
Obligations of Fragile or Failed States, NYU Hauser Globalization Colloquium (2010).
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launch any kind of accountability process whatsoever, a sign of a kind of
persistent pathology of political culture. But where something is being
done or planned to address past wrongdoing by domestic institutions, then
the questions of how to evaluate its adequacy and, related to this, what
degree of deference to afford domestic decision makers, become acute.
One of the major developments in the current jurisprudence is the
turn to criminal law enforcement, apparently requiring as a part of state
responsibility that the state undertake to investigate and prosecute individuals, to specify the nature of the relevant offenses, and to specify the particular courts in which such prosecution should take place. Hence, one of the
important effects of the trend toward judicialization of these issues has
been the individuation of accountability for systemic rights-violating policy
in cases of serious rights violations. This individualization is reinforced by
related state accountability to organize their judicial apparatus in order to
make this happen. Typically states criminalize offenses and assure
enforcement of punishment, as a start.93
A. Is There a “Human Right” to Retributive Justice and, Likewise, a
State Duty to Prosecute?
The above analysis has considered cases conceptualizing the right to
accountability in terms of an obligation to investigate. I now turn to cases
that go much further to provide that there is an apparent “duty to prosecute.” One can see that at the present moment, the IACHR is more willing
to move in this direction than the ECHR. Nevertheless, there are signs of
the potential for further consolidation of doctrine.
While one can see that a duty to investigate is, broadly speaking, compatible with and arguably can be supportive of non-criminal law transitional justice processes such as truth commissions, establishing a duty to
prosecute implies tilting the transitional justice process towards a particular instrument or approach. The implications for politically bargained
amnesties are serious; moreover, how a duty to prosecute interacts with
traditional understandings of prosecutorial discretion and how it impinges
on prosecutors’ decisions— such as to how to allocate scarce resources—
requires careful consideration.
For example, in Goiburú, the IACHR held that there were violations of
peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) involving, in particular,
the prohibition of torture and forced disappearance of persons.94 These
offenses are included among the behaviors deemed to harm essential values and rights of the international community. These behaviors entail the
activation of national and international measures, instruments, and mechanisms to ensure their effective prosecution and the sanction of the authors,
so as to prevent impunity.95 Given the gravity of these offenses, the norms
of international customary and treaty-based law establish the obligation to
93. See supra Part III.C.
94. Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 153, ¶ 93 (2006).
95. Id. at para. 128.
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prosecute those responsible.96 This acquires particular relevance in cases
such as Goiburú, where the facts occurred in the context of the systematic
violation of human rights— offenses constituting crimes against humanity.
This designation gives rise to the state’s obligation to ensure that such conduct is criminally prosecuted and the perpetrators punished. This goes to
the issue of whether, as a general matter, the duty of accountability for
violations of jus cogens can in and of itself be seen as a jus cogens obligation
(as in the Germany v. Italy case).97 In Margus, the court invoked custom to
justify extending the obligation to punish beyond the case of torture
(where the jus cogens status of the norm is clear) to war crimes generally.98
By analogy, if one considers the relationship of this human rights
jurisprudence to that evolving under international criminal law, these
jurisprudential developments seem compatible with the codification of
offenses under the Rome Statute where “unwillingness” or “inability” to
prosecute becomes the basis for possible ICC admissibility (where other
jurisdictional requirements are met).99 Consider, if there were no sense of
a primary domestic responsibility to prosecute and punish these offenses,
to what extent would ICC jurisdiction on ‘complementarity’ grounds make
sense?
In several cases in the Americas there has been a significant effect of
adjudication in the regional rights court on the duty to prosecute on local
amnesty laws. In Barrios Altos, the IACHR found a “self amnesty law” to be
in violation of the Convention. Indeed, where the perpetrators use their
power to acquire immunity for themselves is the least controversial case— a
travesty of the rule of law.100 Yet, even after a long passage of time, issues
might arise as to whether other rule of law values of stability might not be
undermined even if there are elements of real illegitimacy and a lack of rule
of law in the initial acts. Thus, these questions come up in a later case
regarding Chilean amnesty, Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, concerning
amnesty for events that took place in 1974.101 The IACHR held that the
murder at issue was a crime against humanity and its punishment was
therefore “obligatory pursuant to the general principles of international
law.”102 Interpreting across tribunal precedents, the court looked at the
constitutive instruments of the international criminal tribunals, as well as
96. Id.
97. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, paras. 92– 97 (Feb. 3).
98. See Margus v. Croatia, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 130 (2014).
99. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing that a case is inadmissible where the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, “unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution . . . .”); id. at pmbl.
(stating that “the International Criminal Court . . . shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions . . . .”).
100. Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 75, ¶ 42
(March 14, 2001).
101. See Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (series C) No. 154, ¶¶ 44– 45 (Sept. 26, 2006).
102. Id. at para. 99.
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the UN Report on Sierra Leone (among others), and concluded that amnesties have been ruled out in the case of such serious crimes, including
crimes against humanity.103 Drawing added support from the American
Convention, Article I requires states to promise to protect these rights:
“[C]rimes against humanity are crimes which cannot be susceptible of
amnesty.”104
After Barrios Altos and other IACHR decisions involving adjudication
in the context of counter terror rights abuses,105 one can see the impact
beyond their original political context. The effect was felt in Argentina in
2005, where its Supreme Court held in Simon that there was a progressive
evolution of the international law of human rights and that human rights
had constitutional rank after its 1994 constitutional reform. Therefore, the
state had to reconcile its amnesty laws with the regional rights court’s
2001 Barrios Altos ruling. Going beyond the facts of Barrios Altos, the
IACHR in Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay106 similarly required that
the Court restate . . . the obligation of the State of Paraguay to adopt, within
a reasonable time, all measures necessary to identify, impose liability upon
and punish the perpetrators of the violations committed in the instant case
as regards to criminal proceedings and any other matters resulting from the
investigation of the events.107

Elaborating on the meaning of accountability in these contexts, the
IACHR held in La Cantuta that a truth and reconciliation commission did
not satisfy the right to accountability, and in Goiburú it held that Paraguay’s amnesty policy posed an obstacle to the vindication of the right to
accountability. Paraguay had promulgated a law to compensate victims of
human rights violations, and established a “Truth and Justice Commission
to investigate facts that constitute or could constitute human rights violations committed by State or para-State agents between May 1954 and until
the promulgation of the Act.”108 These measures were recognized by the
court; the IACHR observed that “these laws reflect a willingness to investigate and repair certain harmful consequences of what the State acknowledges were grave human rights violations perpetrated systematically and
extensively.” Moreover, the court further recognized that the state showed
“good faith” in submitting its acquiescence, and that it had helped “define
its own historical memory”; nevertheless, it went on to assert that the acts
103. Id. at paras. 95– 96, 107– 09.
104. Id. at paras. 110– 114.
105. See Martin Bohmer, The Use of Foreign Law as a Strategy to Build Constitutional
and Democratic Authority, 77 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 411, 430– 32 (2008) (alluding to the Simon
case and impact of regional IACHR decisions in Argentina). For critique of these developments, see Fernando F. Basch, The Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights Regarding States’ Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations and Its Dangers, 23 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 195 (2007). See also Robert Gargarella, Justicia penal internacional y
violaciones masivas de derechos humanos, in DE LA INJUSTICIA PENAL A LA JUSTICIA SOCIAL
105 (Roberto Gargarella ed., 2008).
106. See Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 155 (Sept. 26, 2006).
107. Id. at para. 155.
108. Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, ¶ 68 (2006).
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of forced disappearances involved an ongoing complex set of criminal acts,
citing a range of international case law which applied to the continuing
offence “so long as the facts have not been clarified.”109 The court went on
to find that the norm of the obligation to investigate and punish those
responsible is jus cogens.110
Indeed, even where the state had convened domestic prosecutions, the
regional rights court often challenged these, observing that what is missing
is the appropriate characterization of the breach: namely, there was a disparity between the way the facts were categorized domestically as opposed
to the way they would be thought of internationally (for example, defined
as offenses of “torture” and “forced disappearances”). “International law
establishes a minimum standard with regard to the correct definition of this
type of conduct and the minimum elements that this must observe revolve
around the understanding that criminal prosecution is a fundamental way
of preventing future human rights violations.”111
Turning to the European jurisprudence, the ECHR tends to use such
terms as requiring “effective” and “independent” investigations; the court
then asserts that the first implies an obligation of result, the latter an obligation of conduct. These rights of investigation appear to imply the potential of further judicial intervention and in some cases appear to gesture to
the necessity of protection via a criminal justice system.
The European context involves one of ongoing democracy-building
and of strengthening the rule of law, which is very clear as to countries
such as Turkey and Russia. For example, in Aksoy, where an individual
had an arguable claim that he was tortured by agents of the state, according
to the court, an “effective remedy” entailed a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those
responsible (in addition to compensation where appropriate).112 This was
made very clear in Osman v. United Kingdom, where the ECHR asserted
that “[i]t is common ground that the State’s obligation in this respect
extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life” by putting in
place a generally effective criminal justice system.113
There are many complexities in assessing what must be done in any
particular case or set of cases. In Kaya v. Turkey, which involved killing in
violent clashes with security forces, the ECHR asserted: “This involves a
primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place
109. Id. at para. 83.
110. Id.
111. Id. at para. 92 (emphasis added).
112. Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 25 (1996); Kurt v.
Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 36 (1998) (entailing a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible); Kilic
v. Turkey, App. No. 22492/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 62 (2000) (“This involves a primary
duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law
provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by lawenforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of
such provisions.”).
113. See Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct H.R. at para. 115 (1998).
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effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences
against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions.”114
V. Judicial Interpretation of the Human Rights Instruments in the
Relevant Political Context: a Teleological Approach?
The Latin-American case law reflects the political realities of shared
repressive practices which, from the vantage point of hindsight, were continent-wide phenomena endemic in the region’s “dirty wars.” Indeed,
IACHR’s case law explicitly takes into account the regionalism of the policy
as well as the commitment to political transformation. Thus, for example,
in Goiburú, which involved a Paraguayan who disappeared in Argentina
with the involvement of Argentina’s military, the IACHR observed the
regional character of the repression as a yet another added basis for the
court to review state repressive practice in the context of systemic repression in the state as well as in the region.115
There is also the broader relevance of context in the European human
rights system. At its origins, the European Convention expressly referred
to the post war democratization moment as set out in its preamble, and the
text was adopted and animated at a time of democratic transformation.116
With the passage of time and changes in the region, the European regional
rights institution now reflects other democratization aims, such as that of
ECHR supervision of younger democracies to meet the standards of
mature democracies. This is seen in how much (though not all) of the case
law on disappearances comes out of Turkey-Cyprus and Russia-Chechnya.
In situations lacking a stable constitutional court, what role for judicialization in the court’s interpretation of militant democracy? Certainly one can
see this in earlier case law involving Turkey’s constitutional constraints on
party formation where the ECHR upheld constraints of political association in the name of democracy.117 In Timurtas v. Turkey, the ECHR refers
to the jurisprudence of the IACHR,118 but also invokes European values.119
In Timurtas, the ECHR reiterated its reasoning from Kurt and Cakici v. Turkey, stressing the fundamental importance of the guarantees contained in
114. Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 85 (1997).
115. See Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (2006).
116. See European Convention on Human Rights pmbl., Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005
(“Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an
effective political democracy . . . [b]eing resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals,
freedom and the rule of law . . . .”).
117. See United Communist Party of Turk. v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. See also
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
118. See Timurtas v. Turkey, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 221 at paras. 79– 80, fn. 1 (2000);
Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶¶ 102– 107 (2010). See also
Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
119. See Grainne de Burca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal
Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 26– 31 (2010) (discussing the impact of regional
values on cases of international law).
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the Convention’s Article 5 for securing the right of individuals in a democracy to be free from arbitrary detention at the hands of the authorities.120
In Cakici, the court asserted that the right to life:
. . . ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention and,
together with Article 3 of the Convention, enshrines one of the basic values
of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe . . . . The obligation imposed is not simply concerned with intentional killing resulting
from the use of force by agents of the State but also extends, in the first
sentence of Article 2 §1, to imposing a positive obligation on States that the
right to life be protected by law. This requires by implication that there
should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have
been killed as result of the use of force.121

Legal protection implies procedural obligations. This judicial characterization of the relevant obligation elides the “Catch 22” posed by disappearances. Where there is an “unacknowledged detention,” the court
recognizes the engagement of responsibility of the respondent state for his
death.122 The logic follows the reasoning of Velasquez-Rodriguez, the earliest case on the matter in the IACHR.123
The underlying human rights violations that lead to the assertion of a
violation of the right to accountability tend to be of a more contemporary
vintage in the European context; examples include Bulgaria and the former
Yugoslavia.124 The ECHR has read such legal protection obligations in
construing the “right to life” also in cases involving freedom from torture,
even when it is unclear whether or not there is state action; this matters
less because the courts read procedural rights into Article 13.
In particular, one can see this in recent case law involving abuses in
the counterterror campaign, where in addition to the substantive protections, the ECHR recognizes that the right to protection from torture
assumes other rights of what they call anti-impunity or accountability.125
In El-Masri, a case involving detention and secret rendition, the state, having been alerted to the allegations:
. . . should have endeavored to undertake an adequate investigation in order
to prevent any appearance of impunity in respect of certain acts. . . . [W]hile
there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, an adequate response by the authorities in
investigating allegations of serious human rights violations . . . may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or
tolerance of unlawful acts. For the same reasons, there must be a sufficient
120. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 116, at art. 2(1).
121. Cakici v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 86.
122. Id.
123. See Velasquez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 4 at paras. 153-159.
124. Anguelova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 38361/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. 311 at para. 140 (2002).
125. See El-Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09
Eur. Ct. H.R. 80 at para. 192 (2012).
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element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure
accountability in practice as well as in theory . . . .126

Reaffirming the purposes for such requirements, the court said that
“impunity must be fought as a matter of justice for the victims, as a deterrent to prevent new violations, and to uphold the rule of law and public
trust in the justice system.” It went on to find that “the inadequate investigation . . . deprived the applicant of being informed of what had happened,
including of getting an accurate account of the suffering he had allegedly
endured and the role of those responsible for his alleged ordeal.”127
The jurisprudence is informed by an understanding of the original
mandate of these tribunals as contributing to the rebuilding of the rule of
law and stability after periods of widespread political violence and oppression in the region. Thus, consider the post-World War II origins of the
European human rights system, and now its renewed salience in the postCold War era.128 Relatedly, consider that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had as its stated goal “the restoration and
maintenance of the peace” in the region.129 Therefore, in interpreting the
contours of its jurisdiction in Prosecutor v. Tadic, the Tribunal’s Appellate
Chamber sought to understand the authority it exercised expressly in light
of the values that it was created to serve and, implicitly, the agreed importance of these to the international community.130 This kind of substantive,
values-based interpretation is important to understanding the legitimate
exercise of public authority by international adjudicators in the human
rights and international criminal law fields.
A. Cross-judging: Adjudication Across Human Rights Systems
I now turn to practices across human rights systems, which inform the
consolidated doctrine discussed here. Institutions as diverse as the
IACHR, the ECHR, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, (arguably) the International Court of Justice,131 and even the ICC, in applying a
cluster of norms relating to “complementarity,” have been conceptualizing
state responsibility’s relation to past human rights abuses in terms of the
duty to investigate, prosecute, and remediate.132 “Cross-judging”133— as I
126. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Case of Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 55721/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011)); Anguelova, App. No. 38361/97 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Committee of Ministers, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations (Mar. 30, 2011).
127. Id.
128. See generally JOSEPH WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE (1999).
129. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
130. Id. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995).
131. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43
(Feb. 26), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.
132. See Rome Statute, supra note 99, at pmbl. (referring to jurisdiction along complementarity basis).
133. See generally Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented But Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 959 (2008-2009).
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have defined it in a co-authored article of that name— refers to the fact that
the approaches of these various tribunals can be self-reinforcing even
where they do not explicitly cite or engage in “dialogue” with one another.
To appreciate the rise of judicial activism on this front in the IACHR, for
example, it is important not just to see the particular context of the American regional human rights regime but also the broader picture just
described, and the cross-judging between these courts that appears to have
led to the consolidated doctrine regarding accountability in situations of
disappearances analyzed here.
Across judicial systems, as discussed above, one can see that there are
increasing numbers of disappearance cases both within repressive regimes,
as well as in situations of conflict and post-conflict, such as in Chechnya
and in contexts of protracted transition.134 With new actors in the system,
as rights holders as well as duty bearers, there are evident consequences for
the way international human rights law is made and for related policy
sounding in transitional justice. These international human rights cases
across tribunals appear to offer relevant sources of law norms regarding
the meaning of rights enforcement and protection in transition.
While international law is often characterized as decentralized and
lacking in legal integration vis-à-vis domestic law, a countertrend can be
identified as “cross-judging,” the regular invocation of authority across
regions, often outside of hierarchic or other conventions relating to uses of
precedent or sources of law.135 Political and legal context can play an
important role in these cases, with an impact on the merits. This development is illustrated in the case law explored here regarding the consolidation and cross-referencing of doctrine across judicial systems concerning
accountability for disappearances. So far, there is more cross-judging in
the Americas than in Europe. For years, the IACHR relied frequently upon
rulings by the ECHR, though recent case law regarding extreme violations
reflects the reverse invocation of authority.136 For example, consider
Margus v. Croatia, where the ECHR relies on IACHR amnesty doctrine.137
Paying attention to both political and legal context in transnational
interpretation and comparative law may well contribute to a better understanding of this jurisprudence, because it can help us understand just
when, where, and on what basis cross-judging is being deployed.138 For
example, one could see the relevance of judicial contextualization and of
contextual similarities in relying on Latin American amnesty cases, wherever similar facts rise out of the Balkans conflict.139 Cross-judging can
134. See generally Bazorkina v. Russia, App. No. 69481/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006) ;
Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
135. See Teitel & Howse, supra note 133.
136. For overturning the Croatian amnesty act insofar as it was wrongly applied to
war crimes and relying on Barrios Altos v. Peru, see Margus v. Croatia, 2014 Eur. Ct.
H.R.; Varnava and Others v. Turkey, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 147.
137. Margus, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R.
138. See Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2570, 2571– 72 (2004).
139. See Margus 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 19 (citing Barrios Altos).
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illuminate where a rights court is deploying a contextual approach, reflecting the relevance of human rights-related authority beyond the particular
regional system. In Gomes Lund, the IACHR engaged in the judicial practice of interpretation across jurisdictions,140 relying in part on case law
from the ECHR, such as Kurt v. Turkey.141 There, the court asserted that
its jurisprudence had been a precursor to the “consolidation of a comprehensive perspective on enforced disappearances,”142 and in doing so, the
court appears to take judicial notice of the widespread systemic nature of
such politically authorized violence.143
Cross-judging reveals the salience of other contextual dimensions
regarding disappearances, such as the impact of the passage of time on the
duties of accountability. Landmark case law in Latin America characterized disappearances as “permanent and ongoing,” allowing jurisdictional
authority despite the passage of time. For example, in Goiburú, the court
explicitly refers to international case law defining the phenomenon, citing
to ECHR cases such as Cyprus v. Turkey, Ivan Smvers, and Varnava. This
aspect of the case law reflects the transnational, cross-regional element of
rights discourse, as well as appreciation of the distinctive evidentiary and
related issues that disappearances pose for accountability, even in different
historical contexts.144
VI. Normative Considerations and Principles
Given the complexity and sensitivity involved in regional and international tribunals interacting with domestic institutions— which are concerned with transitional justice or managing security issues with profound
political dimensions— what kind of criteria might be appropriate in shaping dialogue between the tribunals and domestic authorities? In what follows, I offer a number of suggestions, informed by the approach to
transitional justice developed in my earlier scholarship emphasizing the
character of transitional justice as simultaneously both legal and political.
The proposed factors identify variables that are of particular relevance to
these contexts reckoning with accountability relating to transitional justice,
not merely context for transnational courts’ legitimacy (such as Slaughter
& Helfer with multidimensional factors of comparative legitimacy, and,
more recently, Von Bogdandy and Venzke who take account of the transnational judiciary’s shifting functionalities).145
140. See Teitel & Howse, supra note 133, at 962– 63.
141. Kurt v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 36 (1998).
142. See Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 153
(July 29, 1988).
143. See Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶¶ 103– 04
(2010).
144. See also David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts and
Tribunals, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 401, 407– 10 (2006).
145. See Armin Von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Functions of International
Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
49, 52– 53 (2013); Ruti Teitel, LJIL Symposium: A Consideration of ‘On the Functions of
International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority’, OPINIO
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A. The Relevance of Context and Capacity
Regional and international tribunals should clearly distinguish
between different contexts that have resulted in failures to investigate, prosecute, and remediate. Many, but far from all, of the Latin American cases
arose out of a situation where there was complete failure to take any steps
toward accountability over decades, despite regime change.146 Indeed, in
this regard, there is a clear correlation between weak states and exogenous
international actors’ (including courts’) involvement in transitional justice.147 That is, it is far less likely the other way around. The question is
what to make of this. It appears that, as an empirical matter, it is in situations of weak and failed states that the courts may have the greatest legitimacy in intervening: breaking political impasse, or at a minimum,
signaling abject political failure or political pathologies that are at odds
with the development of a human rights culture.
Taking note of context in this way requires a method for assessing
weaknesses in the rule of law. One way of doing so would be to take into
account the kinds of indicators that have been developed by political scientists.148 In this area, rule of law appears to have become both the independent and dependent variable. Indeed, one can see that over recent decades,
there has arguably been a shift in the nature of the relevant states
embarked on these sorts of decisions, a phenomenon upon which I elaborate below.
B. From Strong- to Weak-State Transitional Justice
Of late, we are seeing a shift from strong- to weak-state transitional
justice, with an impact on international judicial intervention.149 This shift
presents a number of consequences of transitional justice. Fletcher and
Weinstein conclude, “In all the weak states, the legal system is one institution that is consistently compromised.”150 Often beset by corruption, government interference, poorly trained judges, and lack of due process, these
states often fail to operate under rule of law.151 In looking at the strength
JURIS (Apr. 9, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/09/ljil-symposium-aconsideration-of-on-the-functions-of-international-courts-an-appraisal-in-light-of-theirburgeoning-public-authority; Caron, supra note 144, at 422.
146. See, e.g., TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing revival of humanrights prosecutions in Argentina after thirty years of junta rule).
147. On the problem of evaluation, see Marek Kaminski & Monika A. Nalepa, Judging
Transitional Justice: An Evaluation of Truth Revelation Procedures 3 (UC Irvine Center for
the Study of Democracy, Working Paper No. 10-01-2004, 2004), available at https://
escholarship.org/uc/item/9w9270cf (challenging the normative analysis of transitional
justice along rule of law lines).
148. On the definition of weak states, see Erick Voeten, The Political Origins of the UN
Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 527, 549 (2005).
See also Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States, 29 INT’L SEC. 85, 86– 90, 120 (Fall 2004).
149. See Fletcher et al., supra note 51, at 198– 201.
150. See id. at 196 (defining weak states as states lacking human resources necessary
for a functioning democracy).
151. Id. at 197.
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of domestic and international justice mechanisms:
[A] clear trend that emerges from the case studies is that either international
pressure or a history of a strong judicial system, with respect for the rule of
law, is essential to vigorously implement transitional justice measures such
as trials and truth commissions. A country that is more developed appears
to have greater leeway to institute its own measures.152

Conversely, it is worth considering what light recognizing these new
obligations might shed on the current understanding of the meaning of
human rights protection and the strength of a human rights enforcement
system. Recognizing these new rights and obligations can reveal something
about the changing view of human rights and its relationship to state
responsibility laws. In other words, insecurity can mean politically authorized violence, but it can also mean (sometimes problematically) an authorized absence or meaningful lack of legal protection.
C. Partial Compliance/Partial Impunity— Towards a Continuum of
Accountability?
Greater care might be taken, however, in intervening where some
accountability process has started but has been interrupted or delayed.
There may be a number of political and institutional reasons at play, and
ideally the court should arguably have an appreciation of these reasons
before deciding whether and how to intervene.
There are some judicial opinions that gesture along these lines. In
Goiburú, for example, the IACHR describes the relevant facts as having
occurred within the context of a systematic pattern tolerated by the state;
thus, setting up the applicability of a heightened responsibility. As the
IACHR explained:
This case has unique historic importance: the facts occurred in the context of
the systematic practice of arbitrary detention, torture, execution and disappearance perpetrated by the intelligence and security forces of the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, under “Operation Condor,” whose characteristics
and dynamics have been described in the proven facts.153 In other words,
the grave acts took place in the context of the flagrant, massive and systematic repression to which the population was subjected on an inter-State scale,
because State security agencies were let loose against the people at a transborder level in a coordinated manner by the dictatorial Governments concerned. . . . The Court . . . finds that the context in which the facts took place
permeates and conditions the State’s international responsibility in relation
to its obligation to respect and safeguard the rights embodied in Articles 4,
5, 7, 8 and 25 of the Convention, with regard to both the aspects acknowledged by the State and those that will be determined in the following chapters on merits and reparations.154
152. Id. at 198.
153. See Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No 153, ¶ 62 (2006) (internal cross-references omitted).
154. See id.
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There are situations where the state in question has already taken some
steps towards accountability, and the issue before the court becomes
whether these steps are sufficient to discharge its obligations under the
treaty. Where there is evidence of good faith on the part of the state in
some of these situations, the court might remind the state of its responsibilities under the treaty without engaging in a fine-grained judicial determination of exactly what steps must be taken, signaling that the norms of the
Convention are at issue but that the state in question has some flexibility
to determine the way forward, given the evolving context.155 One should
reconsider along these lines the judicial treatment of justice mechanisms
discussed above in Goiburu, La Cantuta, and Gomes Lund.156
D. Structural Considerations: the Relevance of Principles of
Subsidiarity and Deference
Both the ECHR and the IACHR have recognized that international
human rights systems are subsidiary to domestic systems.157 Moreover,
some appreciation of the nature of the normative relationship is already
implied or referenced in the preamble to the American Convention on
Human Rights, which refers to international protection as “reinforcing or
complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the American states.”158 One might see the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies as itself reflecting or embodying the principle of subsidiarity.
In Baysayeva, the ECHR suggested:
[T]he rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some
degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism; the rule of exhaustion
is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; for the purposes of reviewing whether it has been observed, it is essential to have
regard to the circumstances of the individual case.

This means, in particular, that the court must take realistic account not
only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the contracting state concerned, but also of the general context in which they operate.159 Here, one can see that even in order to decide threshold
jurisdictional issues, as courts are required to do within the treaty system,
courts must evaluate the relevant political context, and factor it into their
155. On the problem of compliance in the Americas with IACHR prosecution orders,
see Fernando Basch et al., The Effectiveness of the Inter-American System of Human Rights
Protection: A Quantitative Approach to its Functioning and Compliance with its Decisions
(2010) 12 INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 8 (2010) (referring to widely shared resistance to compliance in particular to orders to prosecute).
156. La Cantuta v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 156 (2006) (emphasis
added).
157. See Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 438 n.222 (2009). See also Paolo G. Carozza,
Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
38, 38 (2003).
158. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights pmbl.,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
159. Baysayeva v. Russia, App. No. 74237/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 104 (2007).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-2\CIN204.txt

416

unknown

Seq: 32

23-SEP-15

Cornell International Law Journal

8:43

Vol. 48

decision-making concerning whether to take jurisdiction and within what
limits.
Where the right to accountability is being applied in transitional contexts, it may be useful to look beyond the exhaustion of local remedies as a
formal doctrine of subsidiarity, and to consider the politics of transitional
justice and the recognition of a related margin of appreciation granted to
domestic and judicial institutions. For example, some ECHR cases have
addressed a range of concerns involving forms of transitional justice, such
as lustration purges of Communist and other parties, and degrees of judicial deference to the political party’s policy in the relevant state (as in Turkey).160 To what extent can human rights systems, functioning within
regional treaty systems but committed largely to universal human rights,
adequately take into account their relevant political contexts?
This concern still leaves open the question of the state’s relative capacity to prosecute at a given point in time, as opposed to earlier or later in a
transitional process that can be extended, interrupted, or restarted. Judicial intervention at the supranational level may trigger a requirement of a
large number of prosecutions, especially in transitional contexts, and in the
context of fragile or weak states. This raises the issue of “obligation overload,” as articulated by Davis and Kingsbury.161
There are real dilemmas and tensions raised by this line of decisions
in international rights tribunals. New obligations generated by the
judicialization of decision-making concerning justice for past repression
arguably involve preempting a set of questions that had been previously
seen as a matter of state discretion and political imperative. To decide is to
choose the means to advance and protect rights adherence. To what extent
does this trend suggest that the state signatory’s commitments to adherence and to treaty compliance with domestic effects are now being fully
decided by a foreign judiciary? What is the significance of the direction of
the judicial orders in these cases? This raises issues about the potential
fallout of the judicialization of historically political questions of transitional justice.
E. Regional Repression, Regional Judicial Response
In Latin America, for example, many of the repressive policies were
themselves regional, as the “dirty wars’ ” persecutory policy was adopted to
combat an ostensible regional threat of terrorism. The Goiburú opinion
recognized that there was complicity, or coordination, between different
states and their repressive elements in the region, what was known as
“Operation Condor.” The transnational persecution policy embedded in
“Operation Condor” was justified, the court asserted, because of the seri160. Ruti Teitel, Militating Democracy: Comparative Constitutional Perspectives, 29
MICH. J. INT’L L. 49, 62– 65 (2007).
161. See Davis & Kingsbury, supra note 92.
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ousness of the offense and because the judicial opinion can itself offer a
form of remedy.162
Here, one can imagine a federalism-type model whereby the regional
rights courts mediate between the international-universal and the domestic-local; that is, an approach whereby the model is adapted to a sense of
common problems or challenges shared by states in the region that have
suffered from a similar past of oppression and similar political pathologies.
This approach is reflected in those cases where one can see the regional
courts pursuing a teleological (or functional) approach where regional values are being applied to regional problems. Indeed, there are instances
where one might imagine that the regional courts could offer a mid-level
normativity between international and domestic, especially where states in
the region have suffered from a similar past of oppression and political
pathology.163
F. The Complementarity Principle— Generalized
Another potential guiding principle here would be “complementarity,”
by way of analogy with the principle of jurisdiction in the ICC— namely
providing that supranational judicial intervention into cases of transitional
justice should take better account of prevailing efforts toward justice of
different sorts and levels, particularly at the domestic level. In some part,
this relates to the earlier exhaustion requirement contemplated regarding
admissibility in these Conventions.164
As to the “complementarity” norm’s meaning, there is little guiding
scholarship or case law although there are a variety of positions staked out,
including that of “proactive complementarity.”165 Nevertheless, this system also cannot help but raise the question of exactly what duties are triggered, and what rights are protected where states have signed on to
commitments to complementarity in the Rome Treaty. Beyond issues of
capacity, what is the relevance of legal culture, traditions, and other commitments? An instance of the problem is underway in contemporary situa162. See, e.g., Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (2006).
163. Id.
164. Article 46 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides:
(1) Admission by the Commission . . . shall be subject to the following requirements: (a) that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and
exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international
law and (2) The provisions of paragraph 1.a . . . shall not be applicable when:
(a) the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process
of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated;
(b) the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or (c)
there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies.
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 46, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
165. See generally William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49
HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2008).
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tions before the ICC, such as the situation in Kenya in the context of its
post-election violence. The evolving practice of the ICC and its Prosecutor’s Office has begun to shed light on these questions. Of course, properly
understood, acknowledgment of potential degrees of complementarity
complicates any facile understanding of subsidiarity. Indeed, one might
consider these principles as offering alternative approaches to the relationship of the local and the global when it comes to legal intervention.166
G. Political Processes of Deliberation and Consensus
The question of how much deference to give to political agreements on
questions of justice may well have to take into account the legitimacy of the
relevant political processes and agreements at stake. Where judicial intervention would destabilize agreements that have followed regular legislative
standards and included the relevant stake holders, there are competing rule
of law considerations in this destabilization of existing law (Planned
Parenthood v. Casey provides a poignant example).167 Existing statutes of
limitations on crimes might offer just one example of such a recognized
reliance interest.168
A factor for courts to consider is the extent to which these judicial
interventions may pose issues going forward regarding state sovereignty
and the parameters of political judgment. The jurisprudential developments appear to involve a fundamental redirection of decision-making
regarding transitional justice, from the political to the judicialized. There is
an evident narrowing of governmental latitude on the question of how to
respond to human rights abuses in the context of past conflicts that have
left many collective and individual wounds, and sometimes, fractured
societies.
This raises the question of the extent to which domestic mechanisms
established through political bargaining and deliberation might satisfy the
right to accountability. Consider contemporary case law arising out of the
Latin American “dirty war” period discussed above; the IACHR held that
amnesty policies contravened the American Convention because such laws
blocked investigation, and although the country had continued to defy the
holding of reinstating criminal jurisdiction, it had nevertheless recently
established a truth commission. Hence, in La Cantuta, the IACHR rejected
166. See LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS
VIOLENCE 18– 19 (Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf eds., 2010); Rep. of the Independent
Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Comm’n on Human Rights,
Principle 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1; ESCOR, 61st Sess. (Feb. 8, 2005) (by
Diane Orentlicher).
167. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“when this
Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of
prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of
reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”).
168. For a discussion of Hungarian statute of limitations legislation, see Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J.
2009, 2022– 30, 2052 (1997) (arguing that in periods of political change, law is used to
play multiple roles, both constraining and enabling).
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the Peruvian Truth Commission as inadequate. Moreover, in instances
where the state had initiated truth commissions and prosecutions, such as
Paraguay, these too were considered unsatisfactory in part because of the
failure to characterize the crime adequately. In Goiburú, the court asserted
that “[i]nternational law establishes a minimum standard with regard to
the correct definition of this type of conduct and the minimum elements
that this must observe in the understanding that criminal prosecution is a
fundamental way of preventing future human rights violations.”169 In
Gomes Lund, regarding Brazil, the IACHR found that the practice of disappearances itself reflected a violation of a “duty to organize the state” in a
way that guarantees rights recognized in the Convention.170 In recent
years, Brazil convened a truth commission which has just issued its report
and recommendations,171 and one wonders whether this would meet the
demand of the IACHR.172 There is considerable pushback from some
scholars in the region and a number of state parties to the convention as to
whether the IACHR has gone too far.173
In the context of the various rights systems wrestling with disappearance and repressive politics, what, if any, political space remains for stateby-state determinations regarding the appropriate direction of accountability? To what extent are there principles that might mediate the demands of
human rights and those of transitional politics? One wonders what
remains of the South African experience today— perhaps exceptional in garnering a very high level of consensus of a constitutional nature and highly
inclusive transitional justice processes, which afforded full investigation of
the relevant political offenses. Arguably, the courts should take into
account the nature of the process that has produced alternatives to criminal justice forms of accountability, including conditional amnesties. Thus,
the inquiry would ask, for example, to what extent was the transitional
justice decision-making process inclusive, was there extensive deliberation,
transparency, or, on the other hand, elements of intimidation or undue
influence of holdover officials? The phenomenon here discussed concerns
states in fragile political contexts that often have been seen to involve difficult dilemmas and delicate balancing of interests.174
Judicialization risks blindness to or even marginalization of the chal169. See Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (2006)
170. See Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶¶ 103– 04
(2010).
171. See Press Release, Organization of American States, IACHR Welcomes Brazil’s
Truth Commission Report and Calls on the State to Implement its Recommendations
(Dec. 12, 2014), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/
2014/151.asp (describing the Brazilian Truth Commission’s latest report, which
revealed names of “377 public officials responsible for human rights violations committed at 230 different locations within country during period investigated” and noted that
434 persons were killed or forcibly disappeared).
172. Id. See Paulo Abrao & Marcelo D. Torelly, Resistance to Change: Brazil’s Persistent Amnesty and Its Alternatives for Truth and Justice, in AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY 178– 81 (Francesca Lessa & Leigh A. Payne eds., 2012).
173. For critique of these developments, see Basch, supra note 105.
174. See TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL, supra note 7, at 40– 41.
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lenge of accountability as specifically a challenge of transitional justice.175
The IACHR has said on multiple occasions that the political conditions in a
country do not affect the state’s obligations. For example, the Goiburú
court said, “[i]t was only after 1989, when the Stroessner dictatorship fell,
that the investigations in the facts of this case started. Nevertheless, the
conditions in a country however difficult, do not release a State Party to the
American Convention from its treaty-based obligations.”176 In characterizing the offense as ongoing, the successor regime is also implicated until it
meets these obligations. Moreover, even where there had been “acquiescence” by Paraguay, the IACHR held that it was important to have a forum
where the actual facts could be made public— namely, via
judicialization.177
The conclusion arrived at in Goiburú— that international law constitutes the “minimum”— suggests that, in the court’s view, there is very little
room for state-by-state determination of what constitutes the appropriate
response in these transitional justice-related cases. What space might be
left regarding states’ implementation of the means to assure right protections under these treaties? Are all amnesties, no matter whether conditional on particular political tradeoffs, off the table? Is there really a
human rights obligation to prosecute all those responsible? To what extent
are there any areas of transitional justice that can be left to political
judgment?
Moreover, the move to the human rights courts, judicialization, and
the ensuing individuation of remedies poses a challenge to the survival of
the collective dimensions of transitional justice. The problem raised by
individuation through litigation was underscored by Justice Trindade in
Goiburú writing separately on the trends of “criminalization of grave
human rights responsibility,” and “international responsibility aggravated
by state crime.”178 He calls for a greater convergence between these two,
observing that the trend of the IACHR has been to individual criminalization of responsibility of state crimes, resulting in a loss due to the absence
of a public hearing. Consider also the trade-offs involved in the judicial
rejection of truth commissions as inadequate to discharge responsibility for
the right to accountability, as in the case of Peru where an individual
record was preferred to a broader societal one.
Conclusion: Relative Institutional Legitimacy
The complex normative challenges and choices discussed above may
ultimately lead us toward a different way of posing the question of democracy— one that brings in considerations broader than democratic consent,
such as the relative competence or legitimacy of international courts and
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
See Goiburú v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (2006).
Id.
Id.
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tribunals. As I elaborated in Humanity’s Law,179 the primacy that attaches
to human security in the framework of norms currently animating international legal authority may reflect recognition that human security— including elements of legal security (rule of law)— is a predicate for the
fulfillment of a broader range of rights, including democratic rights. In
this light, it is worth looking at the rise of international adjudication in the
post-Cold War world along with the increasing attention on the problem of
weak and failed states. The decisions of international adjudicators in the
international criminal law and human rights law areas often respond
directly to political and legal institutional failures, or gaps at the state level.
The authority of international adjudicators may thus be seen as relative to
that of other institutions. One can say that this is explicitly contemplated
by the conception of “complementarity” that governs the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC, legitimating the intervention of the court on the basis
of the unwillingness or incapacity of domestic institutions. The burgeoning caseloads of the IACHR and the ECHR are concomitant with
problems emerging from weak domestic legal systems and specific threats
to the rule of law domestically.180 The role of judicial review and its legitimacy is at the same time circumscribed by principles of admissibility and
substantive jurisdiction, and further relativized by domestic politics and
the vision of threshold guarantees of the community delimited by the
regional covenants.
A final point should be considered that is related to the observation
that substantive values have a role in legitimating the authority of international adjudicators. Consider just how judicial discourse shifts power on
the one hand— apparently superficially to itself by promoting judicial
accountability— and, on the other, by empowering non-state actors who in
turn become agents of legitimacy by addressing themselves in various ways
to international courts and tribunals, and being addressed by them. International courts and tribunals are well-situated to supply a rights-based discourse at least partly detached or autonomous from national political
cultures and constitutionalisms— universal, secular, transnational— and
with the authority of high human values. In a world that is interdependent,
but not politically integrated, there may be a need for a potentially universal discourse that can still function in a context between different persons— one that comprehends wrongdoing and can be diffused through
multiple institutions that would otherwise be isolated or fragmented. It
would be a discourse that allows recognition of individual rights, and attribution of individual responsibility and accountability with or without the
state, arguably allowing for some change. International adjudicators are
179. See generally TEITEL, HUMANITY’S, supra note 11.
180. See, e.g., Baysayeva v. Russia, App. No. 74237/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1 (2007);
Bazorkina v. Russia, App. No. 69481/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3 (2006); Isayeva v. Russia,
App. No. 57950/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3 (2005); Timurtas v. Turkey, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
2– 4 (2000); Kurt v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3– 5 (1998); Cakici v. Turkey, App.
No. 23657/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3 (1999); Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 3.
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better situated than many other international institutions to supply this
discourse, and the discourse is arguably a source of self-legitimization for
international courts.
In sum, given the above analysis of the interpretive and discursive role
played by international judiciaries, there are good reasons to be comfortable with current answers to the legitimacy question. Indeed, perhaps, dealing with this question has always been to a greater or lesser degree a
relative matter.181 In some regard, this Article addresses an interaction
between legal conceptions of accountability and relevant political conceptions.182 While, in certain circumstances, we might imagine the legal conception should win out and that political accountability should yield, the
result of that inquiry will depend on context. On the other hand, what
does not follow is automatic displacement of a worked-out political consensus on what is just with a judicial understanding.

181. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
BAR OF POLITICS 30 (2d ed. 1986).
182. See Keohane, supra note 1.
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